Recent progress to better understand the environmental threat of micrometeoroid and space debris to the radiator for the solar dynamic power system on Space Station Freedom is reported. The objective has been to define a design which would perform to survivability requirements over the expected lifetime of the radiator.
ES i total spacing between first bumper and back wall (cm); that is, sum of all interplate spacings in multishock shield configuration.
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P 1 facesheet (bumper) density (g/cm 3)
oy2 back wall yield stress (ksi) 0 impact obliquity angle measured from surface normal (deg)
BACKGROUND
The solar dynamic radiator (SDR) is designed to perform as the thermal sink for the Closed Brayton Cycle solar dynamic power system on Space Station Freedom. The solar dynamic power system and the SDR have been described in detail elsewhere.( 14, 10 ) A previous paper (13) gave an overview of the preliminary testing and analyses performed to initially quantify the probable survivability of the SDR over its lifetime in the orbital debris environment. This paper describes further testing and analysis undertaken to achieve a better understanding of the response of the SDR to the environmental threat of hypervelocity impact (HVI) from micrometeoroids and space debris. This component of space hardware is unique enough in configuration such that previously developed survivability prediction techniques cannot provide adequate insight as to whether the radiator design could meet the required probability of survival over the 10 year lifetime in low-earth orbit. In addition, no satisfactory technique existed to evaluate design changes made to improve radiator protection from orbital debris impacts. Thus a program of testing and analysis was initiated to ensure that the survivability requirements could be met.
This particular study focuses upon design of the radiator panels for survivability under hypervelocity impacts. Survivability of other radiator components was discussed in the previous paper. Figure 1 illustrates the configuration of the radiator panels, designed to efficiently reject waste heat from the flow tubes (coolant passages), through the extruded bumpering around the tubes, and finally to the outer surface, which is coated with a highly emissive white paint. Paramount to successful radiator operation is maintenance of a sealed, and unobstructed, coolant flow path. An environmental threat to the radiator panels is that hypervelocity impact from a micrometeoroid or debris particle could puncture a flow tube. For this reason, among others, the radiator is designed with an entirely redundant flow path to be used if the primary flow path cannot function.
The previous paper (13) reported results of a series of 12 HVI tests performed on SDR panel samples. That test series has been designated 'phase 1' of the current program. The results presented herein are referred to as 'phase 2' results.
OBJECTIVES FOR SECOND PHASE OF TESTING
The objective of this study was to refine the phase 1 meteoroid and debris penetration assessment for the SDR. The phase 2 test methodology was designed to establish the effect of impact angle (obliquity) and to characterize the "impact limit" of the flow tubes within the panels; that is, the impact conditions that just cause failure (penetration) of the flow tubes. (Failure is defined as flow tube penetration. "Pinching" of a tube is not considered a failure as the radiator can continue to operate under this condition because of the parallel flow configuration.) In addition, protection benefits associated with an increase in tube wall thickness were determined. Some limited testing to assess projectile velocity effects and effects of HVI on the panel coating were also performed.
SECOND PHASE OF HYPERVELOCITY EVIPACT TESTING

Test Facilitv
As with the first test phase, the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Research Laboratory (HIRL) performed the second phase of SDR HVI testing. This study used the HIRL 4.3 mm gun (launch tube bore diameter) which is capable of launching 3.2 mm diameter spherical projectiles at 7 km/sec. Diagnostic data on the tests were obtained by using a high-speed laser-shadowgraph framing camera. The camera is used to confirm projectile velocity and integrity, and to provide impact data such as ejected particle pattern and velocity. (5, 12) Test Articles. Four types of test articles were used for evaluation in the second phase of HVI testing. These are shown in Figure 2 (a). The test articles contain extruded aluminum now tubes sandwiched between aluminum honeycomb. This matrix is bonded between 0.010 in. aluminum facesheets (Fig. 3) and 2 differ only in the extrusion wall thickness (0.032 in. versus 0.05 in., Fig. 2(b) ). As discussed in the phase 1 report, (13) Test Procedure. Test conditions for 33 hypervelocity impact tests conducted during the second phase of the SDR testing are given in Table I . The majority of the tests were conducted with round aluminum projectiles to simulate the density (but not necessarily the shape) of orbital debris. Because meteoroids have a lower density (0.5 g/cm 3 ), two tests were performed with nylon spherical projectiles to assess projectile density effects. Projectile sizes from 1.0 mm to 2.4 mm were used, with obliquity angles varying up to 75° from the surface normal. All but two tests were performed with the shot line direction perpendicular (normal) to the axis of the flow tube; the shot direction of the two exceptions was parallel to the flow tube. Figure 4 illustrates the test setup. An aluminum "witness plate" (typically 0.4 mm A16061-0) was placed 2.5 cm behind the test panel to gauge the effects from products of penetration. The "ejecta catcher" in front of the panel was used to record the damaging effects of particles ejected from the front surface of the panel. Typically, the ejecta catcher was 0.3 mm Al 6061-0, but Al 3003-H12 ejecta catchers up to 0.64 mm thick were used for some shots, such as the very high obliquity shots, which generated particularly damaging ejecta. Test velocities ranged up to 7.8 km/sec. It is estimated that only about 25 percent of all orbital debris impacts will occur at 8 km/sec or less, but this is currently the highest velocity available experimentally in the particle range of interest. The average impact velocity for orbital debris at Space Station Freedom altitude is over 10 km/sec, while average meteoroid velocity is 20 km/sec. Thus some method is needed to scale the experimental results to velocities experienced on-orbit. The approach of this study is to use the lower speed test data to modify existing semi-empirical models that have been previously developed for dual multiplate aluminum structures. (1-4) Semi-empirical predictor equations combine HVI test data with an analytical or theoretical basis for scaling to higher velocities. But given the complex geometry of the radiator panels, with internal honeycomb, thick bonding adhesive layer, and nonparallel surfaces, some adjustment of the semi-empirical equation parameters become necessary. These modifications are based on the test data.
Low speed impacts can sometimes be more damaging to spaced shields because less projectile fragmentation occurs. (1) Consequently, a few tests were conducted to determine if damage to the radiator structure at lower velocities is more or less severe.
RESULTS FROM SECOND PHASE OF HVI TESTING HVI Data
Data on the extent of damage to the radiator panels from the second phase of HVI testing is listed in Table II . Comments on the damage to the bumper interior section and flow tube (if applicable) of the extrusion are given. A simple leak check was performed to determine if an extrusion was perforated (completely penetrated) by filling the extrusion with water under ambient conditions (unpressurized) and checking for leaks. Perforation is considered failure. Damage to nonperforated extrusions is indicated by the extent of closure or "pinching" of the flow tube.
In addition to perforation assessment, general damage to the facesheet and honeycomb was assessed. Facesheet hole sizes were measured from the inside of the hole. The front facesheet holes were generally elliptical with the long axis parallel to the direction of projectile flight, but became more irregular as obliquity angles increased. The Z93 white paint partially spalled (that is, it was ejected by the impact shock) from a small area around the front facesheet impact hole. The coating spall size was typically 4 to 6 times the diameter of the projectile at the impact conditions tested. Back facesheet damage given in Table II only indicates the hole measured at the surface of the panel. Much more extensive damage occurs to the back facesheet from tearing and petaling of the facesheet. The honeycomb damage size is a rough measure of the area of crushed and ejected honeycomb. Figure 5 shows the result of a 2.38 mm aluminum sphere impacting at a 60' angle at 6.95 km/sec (HIRL Shot A1070). Note the small entrance hole on the front sheet and the petalled hole in the back facesheet. Generally, high obliquity shots had less rear facesheet petaling; that is, a 45' shot exhibited a larger petalled area than an equivalent 60' shot. However, the witness plates mounted behind oblique shots do not have a great deal of damage. As displayed in Fig. 5 , the witness plate is coated with black powder debris and is severely deformed, but only exhibits a few fragment impacts that left dimples on the witness back surface and no perforations. This indicates that the projectile debris that exited the panel contained no large fragments and produced a primarily impulsive load to the witness plate.
The ejecta catcher plates, on the other hand, had multiple perforations with many of these concentrated near the surface of the panel. As demonstrated by comparing the damage patterns in the ejecta catchers, the damage from secondary ejecta debris increases substantially as impact obliquity angle increases. A detailed analysis of the ejecta catchers should be performed to correlate damage extent with impact conditions, and to make quantitative predictions of the secondary debris hazards to nearby structures such as the solar dynamic concentrator assembly.
Damage to a coated radiator panel from HVI is given in Fig. 6 . A 2.0 mm aluminum sphere impacting at 45' and 6.83 km/sec created a petalled hole on the coated facesheet of the rear of the panel. The coating remained relatively intact, and even adhered to a large portion of the surface area of the petals in the facesheet. 
The use of this equation is based on the assumption that the damage sustained by the extrusion is primarily due to an impulsive load from the projectile debris, and not primarily from fragment damage. One of the main reasons for using this equation is the multishock configuration of an oblique impact directed through the honeycomb. Because the geometry of the radiator panels is different than the multishock shield configurations which were used to derive the coefficient, C, of Eq. (1), this aspect of the equation was modified based on the test results. The modified Cour-Palais multishock equation to be used as the predictor equation for critical particle size causing radiator tube failure was derived as:
where C is 0.993 (g-km/(cm3_S)) 1/3 This equation predicts the particle size causing perforation of the extrusion wall. Particles that do not fail the extrusion can still cause "bulging" or "pinching" of the tube wall or other damage to the interior of the extrusion, although the radiator can continue to operate under these conditions. To prevent any damage to the extrusion interior, the coefficient in Eq. (3) should be decreased by Cp = 0.68 (g-km /cm3-s)1/3.
Evidence to support use of a modified multishock equation includes the primarily impulsive load damage observed on the witness plates mounted behind the panels, and the impulsive load type damage (bulging) observed in the extrusions. The nonperforating damage to the extrusions was manifested in a deformation or bulge that extended into the now element. No obvious cratering or dimpling from fragment damage was noticeable from the optical examinations of the extrusions.
For small obliquity angles, from 0° to approximately 15°, the projectile will penetrate through a single bumper. Thus, a CourPalais Whipple shield predictor (4) was used for determining the critical particle size causing tube failure:
where the coefficient C n was modified from experimental results and was found to be 34 km-g 2/3 /(s-cm' 2 ) to prevent tube failure. Tables III and IV contain the results from applying Eqs. (2) and (4) to predict the critical particle size for each of the phase 2 HVI data shots. Equation (2) parameters, such as spacing and obliquity angle, as well as miss distance, are defined in Fig. 7 . The difference between actual projectile diameter and calculated critical diameter (d dc ) to fail the radiator extrusion and flow tube is also given. W hen this difference is positive, perforation of the extrusion is predicted. If negative, perforation is not expected, but damage in the form of bulging or pinching without perforation can occur. Projectile Diameter (dp) dp -do mm 
METEOROID AND DEBRIS HAZARD ANALYSIS
The semi-empirical equations based on the experimental results were used to perform an assessment of the probability of failure of the radiator panel flow tubes from meteoroids and orbital debris.
Equations (2) and (4) Table V . These data are based on a total flow tube area of 24.78 m 2 . The numbers were calculated using the currently baseline space station orbital debris (6) and meteoroid (11) environments. Impact rates from critical particle sizes at both a 400 km (215 nm) operational altitude and the 500 km (270 nm) maximum altitude specified in space station design requirements, (11) are indicated. Table V shows that at the 500 km maximum altitude, the probability of no-failure of either of the two loops from orbital debris and meteoroids is 0.83 over 10 years (i.e., there is one chance in six that one of the two loops in each SDR system will fail in 10 years). This was calculated from the individual probability of no-failure of the primary and secondary loops which are both 0.91 over 10 years (i.e., 0.91 2 = 0.83). The chance that both primary and secondary loops in a SDR system will fail from meteoroids and debris over 10 years is less than 0.8 percent (i.e., 1 -0.9921). Thus the current design meets the current SDR design requirements.
Similar calculations can be made for the thick walled (0.05") extrusion as given in Table 6 . In this case, the probability of failure of an individual loop increases to 0.92 over 10 years at 500 km, which results in an increase to 0.84 of the probability of either loop failing and 0.933 of both loops failing.
More detailed results showing the probability contribution as a function of obliquity angle will be published later this year by the authors.
Sensitivity to Debris Environment. An updated orbital debris environment has been developed from the latest ground-based measurements and returned spacecraft materials. (7) This updated environment is more severe in terms of potential damage than the debris environment (6) currently used for space station design. Adoption of the new debris environment definition is pending final space station approval. Recent activities on the part of the international community in reducing the incidence of catastrophic satellite breakups has resulted in a reduction in the predicted growth of the small debris particle population.( §) Currently, a 2 percent per year growth in the small debris particle population is projected (Kessler, Discussion of Analysis Assumptions. Several assumptions were made in the penetration assessment analysis that make the calculations conservative (worst case). These include:
(1) Worst case orientation of the oblique impacts was assumed; i.e., perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the flow tube.
(2) No account was made for added resistance to penetration of the small diameter flow tube relative to the same thickness flat plate.
(3) No account was made for shadowing from the debris and meteoroid flux by the solar dynamic concentrator and other nearby equipment during part of the orbital period.
(4) Recent thermal design optimization of the SDR has reduced the number of panels and number of tubes per panel. Thus the vulnerable area used in these calculations is larger (by at least 15 percent) than that currently expected on-orbit.
Other assumptions tend to increase the uncertainty of the analysis. These include:
(1) The exposed area is equal to the total outside surface area of the flow tubes. This assumption implies that any particle whose original flight line does not intersect with the flow tube will not fail the tube. however, because of the expansion of the debris cloud behind the face sheet, there is a finite probability that a large enough impact occurring on the radiator panel surface can fail a flow tube even if it would not have originally intersected with it. On the other hand, shielding of the SDR by other space station components was also not accounted for.
(2) The actual debris impact angle and velocity distributions encountered by the SDR during on-orbit operations was not accounted for. Average debris velocity and random impact angle assumptions were made in the penetration assessment given in this paper.
(3) The impact response of the flow tubes under HVI testing conditions (i.e., near vacuum -150 µm pressure, and ambient temperature) versus that of actual on-orbit operating conditions has not been assessed.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
A series of 33 hypervelocity impact tests have been performed in a second phase of testing on representative solar dynamic radiator panel elements to complement test results from more limited first phase testing.
Using current Space Station environment models. (6.11) the panel tubes in the baseline solar dynamic radiator system have a 0.992 reliability (with redundancy) from failure by meteoroid and debris impacts over 10 years. For a single loop, the calculated radiator probability of no-penetration due to hypervelocity impact is 0.83 over 10 years (i.e., 17 percent chance of penetration).
For the updated debris environment (7) with a 2 percent small debris growth rate, the baseline solar dynamic radiator panels have 0.97 probability of no-penetration with redundancy from meteoroid and debris impact over the 10 year period 2001 to 2010. For a single loop, the probability of penetration due to hypervelocity impact is 31 percent.
Increasing the extrusion wall thickness from 0.032 to 0.050 in. provided a very limited increase in protection. Lower velocity tests did not show increased damage when compared to equivalent tests at higher velocities.
The radiator system is made up of more than just the panel tubes. The reliability of the radiator panel interconnect lines and other subsystems exposed to the meteoroid and debris environment should be assessed in a similar hypervelocity impact test and/or analysis procedure, and the results included in an overall assessment of the radiator system reliability.
The second phase of tests has demonstrated that less damage (greater survivability) is observed under HVI test than predicted by available analytical models for the configuration under study. Thus, even limited testing is of value for development of some space hardware.
The HVI test methodology developed for the SDR has been applied to other space station hardware, such as the photovoltaic radiators. Data recorded on damage to aluminum honeycomb is currently being assessed for application to other space station hardware.
